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The Changing Nature of Communications
Law Practice
by STUART N. BROTMAN*
I
Introduction
Communications law today is over a half century old.1 Sur-
prisingly, though, few communications lawyers have systemati-
cally focused on where communications lawyering has been,
and where it is headed in the years to come. This article will
provide a retrospective and prospective look at communications
law practice from its roots in the administrative processes of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) to the new realities fostered by deregulation.
The development of communications law practice is pre-
sented here in four chronological phases. The first phase is
based on the FCC acting as a trier of fact in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. The second phase emphasizes the quasi-legislative na-
ture of the informal rulemaking process which, to date,
continues as the Commission's primary policy formulation tool.
The procedural transformation from adjudication to rulemak-
ing raises important questions regarding the extent to which
the FCC should allow access by communications lawyers to
Commission decisionmakers once the public aspects of a
rulemaking proceeding are concluded.
The third phase is characterized by a broadened base of inter-
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Northwestern University; M.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Califor-
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1. See Geller, Communications Law--A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J.
73 (1985).
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venors both in adjudication and rulemaking. Most notable here
is a judicially imposed expansion of standing in adjudicatory
proceedings. The emergence of a small yet influential group of
public-interest lawyers during this period has also redirected
litigation toward shaping policy beyond the confines of conven-
tional adjudication or rulemaking.
The fourth phase, from now through the foreseeable future,
represents what may be the most radical departure of all from
previous communications law practice norms. With a firm
commitment to deregulation at the FCC during the Carter and
Reagan Administrations, as well as in Congress, executive
branch agencies, and the courts, much of the FCC orientation
of communications law is fading. Under deregulation, less em-
phasis is being placed on the FCC's role as a decisionmaking
authority in favor of an expanded role for competition within
the communications marketplace. Consequently, the commu-
nications lawyer of the future will have to reorient the nature
of the practice from administrative law to negotiations on be-
half of clients in transactional settings.
This article, in short, will set forth how the "rules of the
game" of communications law practice have changed. In doing
so, it will focus on the need for communications lawyers to
adapt as new developments in the regulatory structure emerge.
II
Communications Law Practice and the
Adjudicatory Model
Broadcast regulation was originally conceived to organize the
chaos of the airwaves. Prior to 1927, no structure for broadcast
regulation existed; the only statute specifying any type of su-
pervisory control over the airwaves was ruled inapplicable.2
Any entrepreneur could obtain a license to broadcast, without
enforceable confinement to a specific frequency.3 As a result,
broadcast signals frequently overlapped, creating a modern-day
Tower of Babel.4 At the first National Radio Conference in
1922, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover summa-
2. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
3. For example, in 1922, there were only 29 available wavelengths for more than
17,000 private stations of all classes, including 569 broadcasting stations. W. EMERY,
BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATIONS 27 (1971).
4. See S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 123-29 (3d ed. 1972).
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rized the necessity for order if both the broadcasters and the
public were to be served: "This is one of the few instances that
I know of in this country where the public-all of the people
interested-are unanimously for an extension of regulatory
powers on the part of the Government."5
The 1922 conference, first in a series of collaborative annual
meetings between broadcast industry leaders and the Secretary
of Commerce, resolved "that radio communication is a public
utility and as such should be regulated and controlled by the
Federal Government in the public interest.
'6
Within five years, pressure by the courts, the broadcast in-
dustry, the executive branch, Congress, and radio listeners coa-
lesced to create the Radio Act of 1927.1 This Act created a five-
member commission with the authority to grant, renew, or re-
voke station licenses, under a vague, discretionary licensing
standard incorporating "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity."' Although the legislation created an interim Federal Ra-
dio Commission (FRC) to operate for only one year, Congress
continued to renew the FRC's annual tenure until the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act) 9 created a
5. Id. at 131 (quoting from Department of Commerce, Minutes of Open Meeting
of Department of Commerce Conference on Radio Telephony 1 (mimeo, 1922)).
6. J. ROSENBLOOM, Appendix I: Authority of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING 104 (J. Coons ed. 1961)
(quoting Hearings on HR 11964 32 et. seq.).
7. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). For an excellent legislative history of
the Radio Act of 1927, see ROSENBLOOM, supra note 6, at 99-130.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a)(d), 309(a), 310, 312 (1982). Former FCC Chairman Newton
Minow has suggested that the "public interest, convenience and necessity" standard
written in the Communications Act of 1934 may have originated by political coinci-
dence rather than political intent:
When I first went to the Federal Communications Commission, and joined
all those who have tried to figure out what the law meant, I found that the
man who actually wrote the enabling act, Senator Dill from the state of
Washington, was still alive. I tracked him down and asked him how he rec-
onciled the conflict between the ban on censorship and the requirement that
the broadcaster meet a statutory standard of "public interest, convenience,
and necessity."
The senator said, "Well, young man, when we were writing that law, we
knew we had to have some kind of a standard, and I had a young lawyer
working for me who had been at the Interstate Commerce Commission
where they regulated public utilities and railroads, and the statutory stan-
dard of the Interstate Commerce Act was the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. That sounded pretty good and we couldn't think of anything
else, so we put it in the Federal Communications Act."
H. ASHMORE, FEAR IN THE AIR 30-31 (1973) (quoting Newton Minow).
9. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-56 (1982).
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permanent Federal Communications Commission.
The independent commission form was well-suited to keep
pace with the changing conditions of a technologically oriented
industry. Congress, courts, and executive agencies were ill-
equipped to match the regulatory commission's potential for
expertise, speed in deliberation, and ability to formulate timely
policies consistent with technological advancement. The Com-
munications Act of 1934 created a multi-purpose Federal Com-
munications Commission charged with executive, legislative,
and judicial responsibilities."0 The "public interest, conven-
ience and necessity" standard of the Radio Act of 1927 was
grafted onto the new legislation to give the FCC a broad man-
date for creative administration and policy planning.
By necessity, the Commission quickly began keeping a
watchful eye on the judicial review process. Its decisions, after
all, would be implemented only if they could survive court
challenges.
Most of the Commission's decisions prior to World War II
were the result of trial-type administrative hearings that re-
flected the constraints of the formal legal process. Communi-
cations lawyers appearing before the Commission typically
were administrative practitioners who represented clients by
filing applications and presenting oral arguments to obtain a
frequency allocation or operating license. Awards of licenses
and frequency allocations came after an extensive comparative
proceeding among all mutually exclusive applicants had been
completed.
According to Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, the "ju-
risprudentially laudable set of constraints" that characterizes
such classic administrative behavior "has an interesting side ef-
fect, which is the creation of substantial delays and legal ex-
penses."'1 - Consequently, for incumbent licensees, a complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies and litigation, if neces-
sary, became a strategic option to employ as a way to maintain
the status quo. The costs involved were small in comparison to
the stakes for an established firm or industry in a regulatory
10. Id. § 151. In its executive capacity, the FCC enforces the rules and regulations
that it formulates in its legislative role. The most common judicial function of the
FCC involved granting broadcasting licenses that are challenged by competitive appli-
cants or petitions to deny. See J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 6, at 96.
11. B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 3 (1978).
[Vol. 9:179
COMMUNICATIONS LAW PRACTICE
decision. Litigation, or the threat of litigation, became a natu-
ral weapon that could be used to forestall efforts by outsiders
to enter the market through Commission approval of a license,
tariff, or other regulatory privilege.12 Adjudication thus fa-
vored the communications lawyer who had the superior ability
to either slow down the process to favor an incumbent, or
speed it up to allow for quicker appeals by a new applicant if
there was an adverse decision at the FCC level.
III
Communications Law Practice and the
Rulemaking Model
Adjudication at the FCC gradually fell out of favor during
the late 1940s with the advent of the informal rulemaking pro-
cess." Compared with trial-type adjudication proceedings, in-
formal rulemaking has several important advantages. First, it
allows for the promulgation of rules of prospective applicabil-
ity14-the essence of modern policymaking. Second, because
the informal procedures are simplified from those required of
"on the record" proceedings, they permit a speedier and less
costly resolution of contested issues of law and policy. 5 Third,
the provision for written submissions during rulemaking pro-
ceedings allows broader public participation. 6 Fourth, because
the FCC is not limited to a decision "on the record," informal
rulemaking allows the Commission to draw better on the ex-
12. Id. at 4-5.
13. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 51-559 (1982), rulemak-
ing is defined as an "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule."
Id. § 551(5). Informal rulemaking is the norm. Section 553(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, however, distinguishes between informal and formal rulemaking. For-
mal rulemaking is required when a statute specifies that a rule is required to be made
"on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 553(c). A more strin-
gent due process scheme akin to an adjudication is required for formal rulemaking. Id.
§§ 556, 557.
14. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 517, 590 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 933-35 (1965).
15. See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185,
189, 192 (1974).
16. The formal procedures set forth in sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1982), make adjudications and rulemakings that
must be on the record extremely burdensome on agency time, staff, and money. See
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 379-81 (1974).
1987]
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pertise of staff members and outside parties.17
Informal "notice and comment" rulemaking under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act involves a simplified agency deci-
sionmaking process. When the FCC decides to adopt rules
informally, for example, it is required to publish a detailed No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in the Federal Register.18 Inter-
ested parties must then be given an opportunity to submit
comments on the proposed rules.19 Finally, when the rules are
adopted, a "concise statement of their basis and purpose" must
be concurrently incorporated into the rules.20
Although rulemaking, like adjudication, is subject to judicial
review, the standard of judicial review is more flexible. Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, the question is whether the
Commission's action was "arbitrary, capricious, or not other-
wise in accordance with law."21 The courts have sought to pre-
serve the flexibility and efficiency of the informal rulemaking
model.22
Modern day FCC chairmen, many of whom were proteges of
prominent national political figures, 3 played an important role
in shifting the policymaking environment at the FCC to accom-
modate the greater flexibility embodied in the rulemaking pro-
cess. With a new focus on policymaking by prospectively
17. See Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61
VA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1975); Verkuil, supra note 15, at 189. See U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 31-35 (1947).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553(b) (1982). The notice must include: (1) a statement of the
time, place, and nature of the proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under
the rule proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved. Id. § 553(b).
19. Id. § 553(c). Such participation may include the "submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Although section 706 is not expressly applicable to informal rulemaking, it
has been widely assumed to establish the standard of judicial review for such proceed-
ings. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 206
(1974). See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1973); United States v. Allegheny
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1972).
22. See, e.g., American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v.
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
23. For example, Newton Minow served as Administrative Assistant to Adlai Ste-
venson, Governor of Illinois, and later as a law partner with Stevenson; Dean Burch
served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee during the 1964 Goldwa-
ter Presidential campaign; Richard Wiley served as Chairman of the United Citizens
for Nixon-Agnew in 1968; and Charles Ferris served as counsel to Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield and House Speaker Tip O'Neill.
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applicable rule, the FCC was transferred in large part from a
quasi-court to a quasi-legislature.
In this second phase, communications lawyers built their
practice on their ability to draft comments and reply comments
to Notices of Inquiry and Notices of Proposed Rule Making.
These filings set forth the substantive position of clients on pol-
icy issues. They simultaneously establish client participation
in the proceeding so that litigation can be initiated if an adverse
policy recommendation is made. Given the legislative nature of
informal rulemaking, success often rests on a communications
lawyer's ability to persuade FCC staff members and Commis-
sioners of the merits of his client's position after a proceeding
has ended. Rulemaking thus produced a new generation of
communications lawyers who were as adept at administrative
lobbying as they were at adjudicatory advocacy.
The lines of acceptable behavior in such lobbying, however,
were not clearly defined at the outset, leaving unresolved how
the FCC would respond to ex parte contacts in informal rule-
makings.
Ex parte contacts are off-the-record meetings and correspon-
dence conducted between agency decisionmakers and inter-
ested persons to a rulemaking after the close of the public
comment period and before the final decision is released.24 For-
mer Chairman Richard E. Wiley of the FCC has characterized
such meetings, along with the written material related to them,
as the point at which the interested parties finally proposed
compromise and fall-back positions, and disclosed the so-called
"real facts. ' 25
There is a two-fold danger in allowing ex parte contacts with-
out restrictions in the regulatory, as distinguished from the
congressional, arena.26 First, these contacts may deprive other
participants in the rulemaking of the opportunity to respond to
new information or arguments raised by other participants.
Second, and equally important, ex parte contacts may hinder
24. See Brotman, Irnformal Rulemaking Procedures at the Federal Communica-
tions Commission: Judicial, Administrative and Legislative Reform, COMM. & L. 3, 4
(June-Aug. 1979).
25. See Remarks of Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, FCC, 4 F.C.C. Mimeo 21343
(April 30, 1974).
26. Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act to establish minimum
due process standards for agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The Act does not apply
to Congress itself. Id. § 701(b)(1)(A). Thus, there are no restrictions on ex parte con-
tact when legislative deliberations on Capitol Hill are at issue.
1987]
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judicial review by obscuring the full administrative record used
by the agency in formulating its policies. Absent such a record,
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether or not
the agency's actions have been in accord with the judicial stan-
dard of review set forth in section 706(2)(A) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act-namely, whether the agency's decision has
been "arbitrary, capricious, or not otherwise in accordance
with law.
27
Traditionally, courts reviewing informal agency actions have
relied solely on the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act to ensure a fully-developed rulemaking record that is
within the statutory limits defining agency discretion. Thus, in-
formal rulemaking proceedings that were in literal compliance
with sections 55328 and 706(2)(A) would routinely pass judicial
muster.29 Courts recognized and sought to preserve the flexi-
bility and efficiency that the informal rulemaking model had
brought to agency decisionmaking s
The first judicial effort aimed at regulating ex parte contacts,
an anomaly when decided, was Sangamon Valley Television
Corp. v. United States,3' a 1959 D.C. Circuit decision. Sanga-
mon involved an informal rulemaking proceeding at the FCC
which had amended the Table of Television Channel Assign-
ments by assigning a VHF channel in Springfield, Illinois to St.
Louis, Missouri.12 After the close of the period for public com-
ment, a representative of a UHF station in St. Louis which was
interested in having a new VHF channel assigned there, sent
each commissioner a letter contending that more Illinois homes
could be reached with a VHF station in St. Louis than with one
in Springfield.3 Since these letters were not made part of the
public record, the parties opposing the allocation change could
27. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Generally, this section details a three-step process that
must be followed when rules are adopted informally (i.e., without utilizing record
evidence): (1) publishing a detailed notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register; (2) designating a period of time that provides an opportunity for interested
parties to submit comments on the proposed rules; and (3) providing a concise and
general explanation of the basis and purpose of the rules if they are adopted. Id.
29. See, e.g., American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
30. See, e.g., American Airlines, 359 F.2d at 629; Automotive Parts, 407 F.2d at 338.
31. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
32. Id. at 223-24.
33. Id. at 224.
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not argue against the new data. 4
When evidence of these ex parte contacts was introduced, the
D.C. Circuit, which initially had upheld the Commission's deci-
sion, reopened the case and remanded it to the FCC for an evi-
dentiary hearing on the effect of the ex parte contacts on the
Commissioners. 3 The court also established a prospective ban
on ex parte contacts for any informal agency rulemaking that
involved the "resolution of conflicting private claims to a valu-
able privilege."3
Sangamon dealt with an informal rulemaking, albeit with
quasi-adjudicatory overtones. There was no foundation in
case law to support the prospective ban announced; section 553
of the Administrative Procedure Act does not expressly war-
rant it, and constitutional due process does not require it.
38
The conclusion in Sangamon thus was rooted in general no-
tions of fairness rather than in the specific holdings of cases
that deal with procedural due process. 9
In a second major case on ex parte contacts, Home Box Of-
fice, Inc. v. FCC,40 a panel of the D.C. Circuit overturned FCC
rules restricting pay cable television programming. These rules
had been adopted in accordance with the requirements of sec-
tion 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. After the last
oral presentation was made, representatives of potentially af-
fected interests, including broadcasters, professional sports pro-
moters, cable operators, and feature file producers, engaged in
extensive lobbying of FCC decisionmakers. The rules that
were finally adopted, not surprisingly, reflected a carefully
drawn compromise that restricted the presentation of major
sporting events and feature films on pay cable systems.4'
34. Id. See Note, Ex Parte Contacts in IWformal Rulemaking: Home Box Office
Inc. v. FCC and Actions for Children's Television v. FCC, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1318-
19 (1977).
35. Sangamon Valley, 269 F.2d at 222-23.
36. Id. at 224.
37. See generally Courtaulds (Alabama) Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899, 904-05 n.16
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); Wright, supra note 16, at 385-86 (section 553 proce-
dures must strike a reasonable balance between fairness and efficiency); Note, The
Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87
HARV. L. REV. 782, 785-90 (1974).
39. See generally Note, Due Process and Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rulemak-
ing, 89 YALE L.J. 194, 198 (1979).
40. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
41. See Brotman, supra note 24, at 6 n.18.
1987]
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The court's reversal of the pay cable rules was based on a
number of substantive grounds.42 It was also based on the
Commission's ex parte meetings with lobbyists. Although the
court would not speculate on the causal relationship between
the meetings and the final decisions, it noted that the evidence
indicated that some industry representatives had expressed
their actual positions only in the ex parte meetings.43 Since
these private, off-the-record communications may have influ-
enced the ultimate decision, the court held that the secrecy of
the contacts was inconsistent with "fundamental notions of
fairness implicit in due process" (reflecting the policy-oriented
approach of Sangamon) and with the "idea of reasoned decision
making on the merits which undergirds all of our administra-
tive law. '44 It also held that the ex parte contacts violated the
requirement that reviewing courts be presented with "the full
administrative record that was before [an agency official] at the
time he made his decision.
'45
This latter requirement derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.46
There, the Court considered an informal decision of the Secre-
tary of Transportation to permit construction of an interstate
highway through a city park. The Court held that while the
traditional "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review re-
mained appropriate for such an informal action, a reviewing
court was nonetheless required to conduct a "searching and
careful" inquiry into the facts, and to determine "whether the
[agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors. '47 Because the "whole record" compiled by the agency
was not before the Court, the case was remanded to the District
Court for "plenary review of the decision. ' 48 Lower courts, in-
cluding the Home Box Office panel, have since interpreted
Overton Park as encouraging substantial review of the
rulemaking record.49 This interpretation, in turn, led to in-
42. See Note, supra, note 34, at 1317.
43. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 53-54.
44. Id. at 56.
45. Id. at 54 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971)).
46. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
47. Id. at 416.
48. Id. at 420.
49. See Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 48-
49 (1975). Section 553 of the Administrative Prodedure Act, however, unlike the ap-
[Vol. 9:179
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creased judicial concern over how an agency conducts informal
rulemaking, and in some cases, generated judicial supplementa-
tion of the explicit statutory requirements of section 553.50
Home Box Office followed this general trend, yet was dis-
tinctive because it dramatically introduced a new, judicially-
formulated remedy for limiting ex parte contacts: once an
agency has issued a notice of proposed rule making pursuant to
section 553, ex parte contacts must be avoided. If they do occur,
they are to be exposed on the public record.5 '
It may be argued that Home Box Office, like Sangamon, is
merely another policy-oriented decision that should be sup-
ported even in the absence of case law precedent. There is,
however, a substantial difference. Home Box Office creates a
more severe restriction-the cutting off of all ex parte contacts
once a notice of proposed rulemaking is issued-without any
measure of sensitivity to the legislative nature of informal
rulemaking proceedings. It achieves the goals of fairness and
judicial review in the absolute sense, at the expence of agency
flexibility. Unlike Sangamon, Home Box Office thus repre-
sents poor policy.
Subsequent decisions, particularly Action for Children's Tel-
evision v. FCC52 in the D.C. Circuit and Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 5
3
in the Supreme Court, might compel agency rejection of the
Home Box Office standard in favor of a more realistic and
workable one that builds on the Sangamon principle.
Action for Children's Television, at first glance, appears to
offer an acceptable approach in this regard. There, another
panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed an FCC decision not to pro-
mulgate specific rules governing advertising and programming
practices for children's television. 4 The Commission had
reached its conclusion after an extensive rulemaking proceed-
ing, which included substantial comments that favored new
plicable statute in Overton Park, does not require specific findings or a full adminis-
trative record. See Verkuil, supra note 15, at 212.
50. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1973) International Har-
vester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).




During the rulemaking, in an apparent response to these
comments, the National Association of Broadcasters undertook
a limited program of self-regulation by reinterpreting and re-
vising its code. These code changes were negotiated in private
meetings with the chairman of the FCC after the final oral
presentation in the proceeding had taken place.5 6 The Commis-
sion, in its decision, cited these code changes as a factor militat-
ing against regulatory intervention. The petitioner charged
that the FCC's failure to solicit public comment on these pro-
posals represented an "abuse of the administrative process,"
and rendered the extensive comment-gathering stage "little
more than a sop."
'57
Judge Edward A. Tamm, writing for a unanimous panel, ap-
plied the literal language of section 553 and found that even
absent an opportunity for response to the industry's self-regu-
latory proposals, interested parties on the whole had been
given the "reasonable opportunity" to offer comments, criti-
cism, and proposals that the statute required. 8 The court also
reasoned that since the record fully explained the Commis-
sion's decision to rely on self-regulation, the failure to include
the substance of the ex parte contacts did not deprive it of a
basis for effective review. 9 It concluded that the decision not
to invite public comment on the industry proposal, although
perhaps "impolitic," was within the Commission's discretion. °
The decision artfully avoided a direct conflict with Home
Box Office by noting that since that case was "a clear departure
from established law," it should not be applied retroactively.6'
Judge Tamm asserted that Overton Park did not require that
"the public record . . . reflect every informational input that
may have entered into the decisionmaker's deliberative pro-
cess."6 2 Yet the remedy he proposed-allowing restrictions on
ex parte communications only in informal rulemaking proceed-
ings with adjudicatory overtones-merely tilted the balance
55. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1974).
56. Action for Children's Television, 564 F.2d at 464.
57. Id. at 468.
58. Id. at 471.
59. Id. at 472.
60. Id. at 473.
61. Id. at 474.
62. Id. at 476-77.
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back to favor the agency, as had been the practice of courts
prior to the era of increased judicial scrutiny.
As the FCC itself noted when it promulgated interim rules
on ex parte communications in the aftermath of Home Box Of-
fice and Action for Ghildren's Television, "The principal teach-
ing of the opinions.., as we read them, is that the practices
which the Commission previously followed were insufficient to
protect the integrity of the rulemaking process. A return to
the status quo ante is therefore unacceptable. 63
In any event, it is unlikely that restrictions ever will be ex-
tended beyond those recommended by the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States. The Administrative Conference
has recognized the need for reform of ex parte communication
regulations at the agency level. Quite correctly, it has rejected
an across-the-board ban on ex parte communications as
undesirable, because it would deprive agencies of the flexibility
needed to fashion rulemaking procedures appropriate to the is-
sues involved, and would introduce a degree of formality that
would, at least in most instances, result in procedures that are
unduly complicated, slow and expensive, and at the same time,
perhaps not conducive to all relevant information."
Instead, the Administrative Conference recommended that
agencies: (1) promptly place in a public file all written commu-
nications from outside parties that are received after the issu-
ance of a notice of proposed rulemaking, and that address the
merits of the rule under consideration; and (2) experiment with
procedures, such as summaries or public meetings designed to
disclose oral communications from outside parties that impart
information or present arguments regarding the merits of a
proposed rule.65
In short, free access to FCC decisionmakers by communica-
tions lawyers is likely to continue at the Commission largely
unhindered, thus ensuring that lobbying skills will remain an
important aspect of full client service. Such skills, of course,
are equally applicable on Capitol Hill, where communications
lawyers maintain ongoing contact with senators, congressmen,
and their staffs to promote client interests.
63. Policies and Procedures Regarding Ex Parte Communications During Infor-
mal Rulemaking Proceedings, 68 F.C.C. 2d 804, para. 10 at 806 (1978).
64. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 77-






Public Interest Communications Law: The
Strategic Use of Appellate Litigation
A new direction for communications law emerged in the
1960s, as lawyers in private practice experienced the influence
that appellate litigation could have on rulemaking as well as on
adjudication. The "new frontier" of John Kennedy inspired a
new generation to participate actively in working toward social
change. The subsequent activism became channeled into two
major socio-political movements during the decade: the civil
rights struggle of the early and middle 1960s, and the anti-war
protests of the middle and late 1960s.66 The issues of social
equality and the Vietnam War energized the national con-
sciousness.67 Sit-ins, teach-ins, guerilla theatre, and campus
rallies were some of the unique tactics employed to attract the
public's attention.
The spirit of activism spread to most major universities, and,
concurrently, to most major law schools.68 Students began to
confront their professors, demonstrating that they were less
willing to accept traditional education, as well as traditional
politics. A greater number of the brightest law graduates from
these schools no longer accepted corporate practice as the only
possibility.6 9 The "market" for legal talent became dominated
by the seller (law students) instead of the buyer (law firms).
The emerging group of activist lawyers rejected the notion of
professional neutrality in favor of a practice that would directly
involve them in social change. 70
In many ways, these new lawyers were similar to their coun-
66. Riley, The Challenge of the New Lawyers: Public Interest and Private Clients,
38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547, 587 (1970). [Ed. note: Riley also discusses the increased
awareness of consumer and environmental issues as a major movement of the time).
67. Cf. Conroy, My Generation, and Jacob Brackman, My Generation, in SMILING
THROUGH THE APOCALYPSE, 537-41, 635-40 (H. Hayes ed. 1969). Conroy recalls grow-
ing up in the fifties; Brackman recalls growing up in the sixties. The contrast pro-
vides reference to the abstract term "national consciousness."
68. See Adelson, Battered Pillars of the American System: Education, FORTUNE
133, 141 (April 1975); Vanderwicken, The Angry Young Lawyers, FORTUNE 74, 77
(Sept. 1971).
69. For example, between 1964 and 1968, the percentage of Harvard law graduates
immediately entering private practice dropped from 54 percent to 41 percent. The
percentage of Yale law graduates dropped from 41 percent in 1968 to 31 percent in
1969. Similarly, the percentage of University of Virginia law graduates entering pri-
vate practice dropped from 63 percent to 54 percent during the same year.
70. Professor Charles Reich, a distinguished law professor at Yale, and a symbol
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terparts in the New Deal. The major distinction was that the
New Dealers trusted big government; by contrast, some ac-
tivist lawyers in the 1960s distrusted big government since they
felt it was inseparable from big business.71
FCC Commssioner Nicholas Johnson characterized this
small group of public-interest lawyers with a romanticized
description:
There's another option for young attorneys, and although it
is not very attractive, many more are beginning to choose it.
The option is the dusty road alongside the Solid Gold Train.
There's no nice ride. You have to walk. It's not air-condi-
tioned. The food is not so fine. The clothes are not so splendid.
You are not always too sure where your next check is coming
from .... And the young lawyers who pass by the Solid Gold
Train are helping the people change the country a little bit.72
At the outset, the new public-interest lawyers rejected the
concept that a "governmental agency can, by itself, adequately
understand or represent the public interest in its dealings with
the public or in its regulation of industry.
73
Although theoretically representing the public interest, the
FCC could not really maintain that perspective in a highly-
charged political environment constantly influenced by private
industry. 4 Within the legal profession, there were no specific
for the 1960s generation by virtue of his book, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970),
frequently spoke about the attitudes of the new lawyers he was teaching:
It is important to recognize explicitly that whether he is engaged publicly or
privately, the lawyer will no longer be serving merely as the spokesman for
others. As the law becomes more and more a determinative force in public
and private affairs, the lawyer must carry the responsibility of his specialized
knowledge, and formulate ideas as well as advocate them. In a society where
law is a primary force, the lawyer must be a primary, not a secondary being.
Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, THE NEW REPUBLIC 23 (Oct. 11, 1969).
71. Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675,
678 (1970).
72. Johnson, Consumer Rights and the Regulatory Crisis, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 424,
433-34 (1971).
73. Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory
and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095, 1098 (1971).
Halpern and Cunningham conclude: "Thus far, the bureaucracies have proven too
limited in resources, too remote from grassroots concerns, and too amenable to polit-
ical influence to accomplish their task adequately." Id. at 1097.
74. "It is the daily machine-gun-like impact on both agency and its staff of indus-
try representation that makes for industry orientation on the part of many honest and
capable agency members as well as agency staffs." Id. at 1097 (quoting James Landis,
REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 71 (1969)).
Additionally, several scholars have noted that while the Commission started out to
vigorously enforce the public interest, it became devitalized during its maturity, and
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representatives for the listening/viewing public. Until the
1960s, however, there was no larger national movement that
supported this type of legal advocacy. The 1960s created a
strong coalition of politics and lifestyle; issues and aggressive
personalities fused together to create a powerful reform
movement.
The emerging public-interest lawyers of this period were also
looking beyond the problem of preserving the adversary pro-
cess toward the goal of democratizing participation in the ad-
ministrative agencies.75 The traditional roles for lawyers and
clients were blurred in the public-interest law movement.
Although the public-interest lawyers in the communications
area usually represented clients, it was not always the case of
the client's articulation of the problem, followed by the law-
yer's application of legal skills.76 In some instances, the lawyer
stimulated a community group to become the client in a given
situation.7 7 This approach was felt to be consistent with an im-
portant public-interest reform goal: long-term policy formu-
lation.
Probably the most common lawyer-client model during the
period was a public interest lawyer representing a public-inter-
est (citizens') organization. The similar philosophy of lawyer
and client created a compatible working relationship.7 This
was different from the traditional "neutral" lawyer, who set
aside personal philosophy in favor of client interest.
If a suitable client did not appear to challenge a major policy,
the public-interest lawyer might have sought one out to assume
the role nominally. Still another possibility existed- public-
interest lawyers, as representatives of the public, could become
declined over time as symbiosis with the industry became firmly entrenched. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions, in THE POLITICS OF REGULA-
TION 80-87 (Krislov & Musol eds. 1964); See also Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Ad-
ministration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1192-93 (1973).
75. See Leone, Public Interest Advocacy and the Regulatory Process, 400 ANNALS
46 (1972). Cf. Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Inter-
est in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1044 (1970); J. Goulden, THE
SUPERLAWYERS 355-57 (1972).
76. See Lobsenz, Everett Parker's Broadcasting Crusade, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 30-36 (Fall 1969).
77. Interview with Victor Kramer, Director of the Institute for Public Interest
Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, in Madison, Wis. (Nov. 12, 1974).
78. With such relationships, the client and lawyer "educate" each other, which
may create greater mutual sensitivity to the respective parties and the larger issues at
hand. Interview with Frank Lloyd, Director of Citizens Communications Center, in




In public-interest communications law, the prevailing public-
interest philosophy was formulated to meet the needs of an
amorphous constituency, the listening and viewing public. This
potentially enormous constituency was both beneficial and det-
rimental to the public-interest communications lawyer. On the
positive side, the pool of political support in theory numbered
well into the millions. By harnessing public sentiment, the
public-interest lawyer could develop significant, continuing ac-
cess to the FCC; the goal was to sensitize the Commission to
the interests of mass media consumers. The problem, of
course, was harnessing that political support. Aside from ideal-
ism and solid legal education credentials, the public-interest
communications lawyers had few initial financial or staff
resources.
8 0
For the public-interest communications lawyer, the issue was
relatively clear. A specialized lawyer and specialized bar, the
Federal Communications Bar Association, in close geographic
proximity to the FCC's headquaters in Washington, evolved to
serve the needs of private interests appearing before the Com-
mission.81 This specialized bar was comprised of traditional
communications lawyers serving broadcasters who could not
represent public-interest organizations because they would be
placed in a conflict situation with the clients they already
represented.
8 2
79. An outstanding example of this phenomenon in public-interest communica-
tions law is Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
80. See, e.g., Shay, The Center for Law and Social Policy: The Public Interest Law
Firm, 1 JURIs DR. 28 (Apr. 1971); Charles Halpern, one of the leaders in the public-
interest law movement, remembered the inital lack of resources: "The most impres-
sive names (of public interest law firms)-Centers, Funds, Councils, and Institutes-
were often facades behind which two or three inexperienced lawyers stood." Hal-
pern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future, 58 JUDICATURE 118, 121 (Oct. 1974).
81. The Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA) was formed in 1936
and incorporated in 1943 as a nonprofit corporation. Its purpose is "to promote the
proper administration of the federal laws relative to wire and radio communications."
Although the majority of its member practice in the District of Columbia, the FCBA's
roster of over 1,300 members includes lawyers from approximately 35 states. FED-
ERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR ASSOCIATION DIRECTORY iii (1986).
82. Al Kramer, Director of the Citizens Communications Center, argued at the
time that" 'specialists' means that the guy has to be representing the industry, if he is
going to make a living out of it. If he is going to (represent) the industry he cannot
argue the other side." MARKS, LESWING & FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 170 (1972). Similarly, the FCC's Policy Review Com-
mittee, in a 1971 confidential report to the Commission, stated:
The problem is one of client relations and credibility as a representative of
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Public-interest communications lawyers, though few in
number, began to attract a national constituency of television
viewers. These viewers were primarily affiliated with a hand-
ful of citizens' special-interest groups that organized around the
country, held community meetings, published newsletters, and
monitored the programming of local stations.8 3 During this pe-
riod, the Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ (United Church) in New York City, established itself as
a national resource center for media reformers.84 The Office of
Communication, headed by the Reverend Everett C. Parker,
served as a clearinghouse for local groups interested in moni-
toring and improving station performance. For several years,
Dr. Parker sought a test case through which to challenge the
rules of standing before the FCC.
Traditionally, intervention in court adjudication was nar-
rowly limited to one who could demonstrate a property right
"which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition
of the court."8" This "property right" test also required that
the intervenor show that his or her interest was inadequately
protected by existing parties.
86
Similarly, the rules governing standing to seek review of ad-
ministrative action were also narrowly drawn. Under the com-
mon law, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the ad-
ministrator had violated "[a] legal right: one of property, one
broadcast interests. A broadcaster-client, it seems, would find it difficult to
understand why an attorney he trusted to handle his interests in Commission
proceedings would represent a public interest group attacking the interests of
another broadcaster, particularly if the client might be susceptible to criti-
cism or attack on the same or similar grounds.... Vigorous representation of
a public interest group, possibly establishing precedent damaging to the
broadcaster-client, in short, would tend to damage the attorney's credibility
as a representative of the clients' interests.
FCC Policy Review Committee, WORKING ON THE SYSTEM 288 (J. Michael & R. Fort
eds. 1974).
83. Such groups included Black Efforts for Soul in Television, Wash., D.C.; Illi-
nois Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting, Chicago, Ill.; and the National Citizens'
Committee for Broadcasting, New York, N.Y.
84. The publications division of the United Church has published several major
guides written for use by citizens groups, among them, PROWITT, CITIZEN ACTION IN
RADIO AND TELEVISION (1971) and JENNINGS, GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING BROADCAST
LICENSE APPLICATIONS & OTHER FCC FORMS (1972).
85. Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J.
359, 363 (1972). For a more detailed description of the historical development of this
right, see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 143
(1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Gellhorn, supra note 85, at 363.
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arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion,
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.""7
The initial liberalization of this "legal right" theory of stand-
ing took place in 1940, in the case FCC v. Sanders Brothers Ra-
dio Station.88 Sanders Brothers sought judicial review of the
Commission's grant of a construction permit to a rival radio sta-
tion. The Commission opposed such review, since the plaintiff
was not a "person aggrieved" within the provisions of section
402(b) of the Communications Act.8 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit unanimously ruled that Sanders was a "person
aggrieved," though not under the "legal right" test. Since the
FCC had no power to grant property rights to the airwaves but
could only award renewable license, no legal right was in
question.90
Instead, the court based its decision on the perceived congres-
sional intent of section 402(b) of the Communications Act.
Although neither the Commission nor the court would over-
turn a grant solely because of economic competition, such a
claim did entitle standing before the court, since, as the court
reasoned, only those facing economic harm would be likely to
seek judicial review in the first place. 91 Therefore, the laws of
the marketplace dictated that such intervenors would be "ag-
grieved" within the meaning of the Act.92
The "Sanders doctrine" had a major impact on the adminis-
trative law of the day, marking the beginning of the liberaliza-
tion of the rules of standing. The doctrine was further
expanded in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC and FCC v.
NBC (KOA).9 3 In these cases, electrical interference with broad-
cast equals was established as a basis for standing.94 However,
87. Van Horne, Citizen Organizations Intervening in Federal Administrative
Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 B.U.L. REV. 403, 407 (1971).
88. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
89. "By any other person who is aggrieved or whose interest is adversely affected
by any order of the Commission granting or denying any application described in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), hereof." 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6).
90. 309 U.S. at 475.
91. Id. at 476-77.
92. The Court surmised that Congress "may have been of [t]he opinion that one
likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of
law in the action of the Commission in granting the license." 309 U.S. at 477.
93. 316 U.S. 4 (1942); 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
94. 316 U.S. at 5; 319 U.S. at 243.
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the Supreme Court noted that such intervention was appropri-
ate because intervenors with direct interest in an FCC ruling
could serve as "representatives of the public interest."9 In this
way, these aggrieved intervenors could act as "private attorneys
general," and check potential abuses of administrative
discretion.96
The issue of standing emerged in a different light during 1964
when two stations in Jackson, Mississippi sought three-year li-
cense renewals. Black citizens in the area had complained that
both WLBT-TV and WJTV had practiced flagrant racial dis-
crimination in their programming.97 Dr. Parker followed up on
these complaints by arranging for the local United Church in
Tougaloo, Missisppi to teach monitoring techniques to twenty-
three residents.
One week of programming on both stations was monitored;
the audio signal was tape recorded, and detailed commercial,
programming, and announcement logs were kept by the partici-
pants. Particular attention was devoted to the appearance of
blacks and the treatment of race relations in station pro-
gramming.
This monitoring supported a previous informal analysis of lo-
cal programming practices by finding a failure to use blacks in
on-camera positions, suppression of network news shows cover-
ing the issue of race relations, discrimination against blacks in
news selection and presentation, and inadequate coverage of
black community affairs.98 These practices were particularly
questionable since a substantial percentage of the population in
the service area was black.9
When the findings of the extensive monitoring project were
95. 316 U.S. at 14.
96. See generally Halpern and Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Inter-
est Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L. J.
1095 (1971).
97. For example, WLBT-TV told the FCC that it had a policy against selling or
affording time locally for programs dealing with the volatile issue of racial integra-
tion. Yet, it sold.time for spot announcements in 1962 to the Jackson White Citizen's
Council, while refusing a request by the NAACP to purchase air time. The station
also editorially opposed the racial integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962,
although no contrasting view was presented. WLBT-TV, citing "cable trouble," also
cut off a number of network programs (e.g., "Bonanza") when blacks appeared. It
presented a weekly church program but excluded black churches from participation.
Lobsenz, supra note 76, at 30, 31-33.
98. Id. at 30.
99. The black community comprised 45 percent of the population of Jackson, and
more than 47 percent of the population within the WLBT-TV service area. Office of
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submitted, the FCC tried to denigrate the monitoring method-
ology. Eventually, the FCC accepted the monitoring data, yet
still dismissed the petitions filed by the United Church to deny
the renewal. The FCC said that the United Church had no
right to be heard according to the precedents for standing, since
it could not prove substantial injury." Instead, the FCC re-
newed WJTV, provided the station continue programming re-
forms that it had instituted on its own. 10 The more pro-
nounced violator, WLBT-TV, was given a one-year renewal
with requirements to improve its programming practices dur-
ing that period.102
The first appeal by the United Church dealt specifically with
the question of standing before the FCC in adjudicatory hear-
ings."' The D.C. Circuit subsequently handed down a
landmark decision supporting the position of United Church.10 4
Judge Warren Burger, speaking for the court, criticized the
FCC's attempt to thwart resolution of a substantive issue with
a procedural roadblock, and asserted the importance of the fi-
duciary relationship between broadcasters and their
communities:
After nearly five decades of operation, the broadcast indus-
try does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broad-
cast license is a public trust subject to the termination for
breach of a duty.... Since the concept of standing is a practical
and functional one designed to ensure that only those with a
genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding,
we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 19, 409, Brief for
Appellants at 9 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 11, 1968) [hereinafter "Brief for Appellants"].
100. Lobsenz, supra note 76, at 32.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Private citizens have historically been granted access to the Commission
through participation in rulemaking proceedings, and have had the ability to file an
informal complaint about a station's operations at any time. R. BENNETT, A LAWYER'S
SOURCEBOOK: REPRESENTING THE AUDIENCE IN BROADCAST PROCEEDINGS 15 (1974).
It should also be noted that the question of whether judicial and administrative crite-
ria should be the same was not litigated, a point later emphasized by the court in its
decision: "All parties seem to consider that the same standards are applicable to deter-
mining standing before the Commission, and standing to appeal a Commission order
to this court.... We have, therefore, used the cases dealing with standing in the two
tribunals interchangeably." Office of Communications of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
104. United Church, 359 F.2d at 994. The three-judge panel, consisting of J. Bur-
ger, J. McGowan, and J. Tamm, was unamimous in its decision.
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acute concern as the listening audience.0 5
Following the court's remand, the FCC granted standing to
the United Church and three associated appellants. 10 6 The evi-
dentiary hearing for the WLBT-TV renewal included questions
of whether WLBT-TV had afforded reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor-
tance; whether the station had afforded reasonable opportunity
for the use of its broadcasting facilities by significant groups
comprising the community of its service areas; whether WLBT-
TV had acted in good faith with respect to programs dealing
with the issue of racial discrimination; and whether in light of
all the evidence, the renewal grant would serve the public in-
terest, convenience, and necessity.107
The appellants were required to bear the burden of proof on
the first two issues; the FCC's Broadcast Bureau (now Mass
Media Bureau) was mandated to bear the burden of proof on
the third issue; and WLBT-TV was required to bear burden of
proof for the final issue included in the evidentiary hearing. 08
The hearing was held in Jackson, Mississippi during May,
1966. The appellants, represented by Earle Moore, a private
New York attorney who also served as counsel to the United
Church, presented extensive evidence showing that WLBT-TV
had failed to program conflicting views on issues of public im-
portance (e.g., race relations), and had failed to afford reason-
able opportunity for the use of its facilities to significant
community groups. 10 9
The Broadcast Bureau, however, was not very vigorous in
pressing its claim. During the hearings, it offered no evidence
and called no witnesses to support its burden of proof. Appar-
ently, the Broadcast Bureau felt that its issue was so closely
aligned with the two issues of the appellants that the appellants
should bear the burden of proof here, too. Similarly, the hear-
ing examiner required the appellants to assume the burden of
105. Id. at 1002-03.
106. In re Application of Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., Order, 3 F.C.C.2d 784, 7
RAD. REG. (P&F) 445, para. 8 (1966). The other parties were the United Church of
Christ at Tougaloo, the local Mississippi parish of the United Church of Christ; Dr.
Aaron Henry, President of the Mississippi NAACP; and Robert L. T. Smith, a black
resident from the Jackson area who also represented the interests of many viewers in
the prime service area.
107. 3 F.C.C.2d 784, 7 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 455, para. 9.
108. Id. at para. 10.
109. Lobsenz, supra note 76, at 33.
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proof on the fourth issue, contradicting a previous interpreta-
tion by the D.C. Circuit.1 '
In addition to receiving full responsibility for the burden of
proof, the citizens groups were placed at severe disadvantages
in other areas. Their witnesses were viewed with skepticism,
they were denied the right to cross-examine, they were ruled
against on every key point, and their evidence was "blithely dis-
regarded or overruled.""' The hearing examiner, as expected,
recommended that WLBT-TV's license be renewed for the full
three-year period."2
Once again, the United Church appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia." 3 Judge Burger took the
rare and severe action of revoking the WLBT-TV license re-
newal without further remand to the FCC."4 He ordered a
new hearing for the vacated license, and sternly admonished
the FCC:
[T]he Commission's duties did not end by allowing Appel-
lants to intervene; its duties began at that stage.... The Public
Intervenors, who were performing a public service under a
mandate of this court, were entitled to a more hospitable re-
ception in the performance of that function ..... The Exam-
iner and the Commission exhibited at best a reluctant
tolerance of this court's mandate and at worst a profound hos-
tility to the participation of the Public Intervenors and their
efforts.
The record now before us leaves us with a profound concern
over the entire handling of this case .... The administrative
conduct ... is beyond repair."'
Many scholars agree that the first United Church case laid a
foundation for public-interest litigation during the next five
years."6 The second United Church case buttressed the public-
interest movement by demonstrating that the political lever-




113. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
114. Id. at 551.
115. Id. at 546.
116. For example, see Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971); Padden,




provided an additional spark by putting the FCC and the broad-
casters in a defensive position.
The United Church, the first citizens group to achieve stand-
ing in a license renewal proceeding, helped create a new client
market for the emerging public-interest communications law
movement. By 1969, the number of citizens groups wishing to
file petitions to deny renewal or transfer, fairness doctrine
complaints, access proposals, minority employment complaints,
and rulemaking comments snowballed. Consequently, several
full-time public-interest law firms developed to handle such
work.
The flurry of public-interest litigation between 1966 and 1972
and the increased scrutiny of the FCC and other administrative
agencies by the D.C. Circuit focused renewed attention on the
courts. During this period, Broadcasting, the industry trade
weekly, bitterly protested what it perceived to be a takeover of
broadcast regulation by the courts. Editorially, it commented
that "[t]he principal power to make and execute federal policy
in broadcast regulation is being captured from the Congress
and the FCC by the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia."
'117
The public-interest law movement did not help to dissuade
this construction of a judicial mystique; in fact, it may have con-
tributed to it. Public-interest communications lawyers in the
1960s viewed the court as the most available forum for gaining
access to the regulatory process. To them, the court could pro-
vide leverage for the public-interest outlook, and prod the FCC
to put its house in better order.
1 8
For many public-interest lawyers, it was important to perpet-
uate an illusion of judicial dominance." 9 The efforts of the
public-interest law movement were largely directed toward
confrontation with private interests and the FCC in a judicial
setting. By building a great amount of faith in the judicial pro-
cess, the public-interest lawyers increased their credibility as
agents of change, and thus gained greater support for their
117. The Take-Over, BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1970, at 78; cf. Life or Death?, BROAD-
CASTING, June 21, 1971, at 108 (courts attack FCC license renewal policy); Absolutely
Open Mike, BROADCASTING, Aug. 23, 1971, at 68 (courts apply fairness doctrine); Who
Does What To Whom, BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 1972, at 104 (courts intervene in FCC
rulemaking process).
118. S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS 261 (1974).




movement. 2 ° Implicit in such a strategy was an underlying be-
lief that the public-interest movement had a number of viable
issues suitable for litigation. Thus, each court reversal of ad-
ministrative action helped to legitimize public-interest law, and
to attract further, often negative, attention to the role of the
courts.
The "activists" of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia during this period, however, did not reflect judicial
usurpation of traditional administrative discretion. Instead it
was a function of new issues being raised before the FCC and
the courts.12' The courts did not attempt to secure additional
control, but rather attempted to ensure that the existing power
structure would not be arbitrarily unresponsive to voices that
had rarely been raised above a whisper.
122
V
Communications Law Practice and Deregulation
By the mid-1970s, a dramatic philosophical shift away from
traditional communications regulation became readily appar-
ent. Such regulation limited market entry by new competitors
in the broadcasting, cable, and common carrier arenas.
Although the FCC had been moving toward deregulation
before this time, deregulation typically had been implemented
on an ad hoc basis. 23
The dynamics of technological change, however, proved too
rapid for the FCC to handle on a case-by-case basis. The rigid
certification process in the common carrier field, for example,
led to promising new services being denied, or else approved
after demand for them in the marketplace already had
passed. 124 An artificial, though inflexible, division between
120. Presser, Public Interest Litigation in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit: A Current Perspective, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261,
264 (1972).
121. For example, in the passive era of the 1950s, no one thought of filing a fairness
complaint against a speech by President Eisenhower that was carried by the broadcast
media. By 1970, the speeches of Richard Nixon on radio and television, often designed
to build support for the White House policy in Vietnam, raised a number of fairness
complaints. See MINOW, MARTIN & MITCHELL, PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION, 70-74, 80-
87, 141-43 (1973).
122. LAZARUS, supra note 118, at 261-62.
123. See Wiley, Competition and Deregulation in Telecommunications: The Amer-
ican Experience, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE U.S.: TRENDS AND POLICIES 37-59
(L. Lewin ed. 1981).
124. See MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOM-
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"communications" and "computing" was also in place by virtue
of the 1956 AT&T consent decree. 25 This situation prevented
AT&T from crossing a line that few could articulate in any ra-
tional way.
126
Economics had become better understood within the commu-
nications policy arena. Both Congress and the FCC looked in-
creasingly to economic analysis in policy formulation, in
particular to the consumer benefits inherent in increased mar-
ketplace competition. 27 In broadcasting, a plethora of radio
outlets in major markets brought into question whether activi-
ties such as ascertainment of community needs and limits on
the airing of commercials were better left to market forces
than to FCC oversight. 28 Cable television was moving into the
major markets as well, with a compulsory license scheme for
retransmitted broadcast signals now governed by section eleven
of the Copyright Act of 1976.129 The FCC thus perceived little
value in continuing restrictions on distant signal importation or
on syndicated programming exclusivity. 30
Congress asserted creative leadership during this period by
initiating omnibus legislation aimed at substantially revising
the Communications Act of 1934.131 A series of detailed studies
and subsequent hearings demonstrated just how much technol-
ogy and competition had changed the regulatory landscape.
32
The Department of Justice simultaneously continued to press
MITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE, 97TH
CONG., 1ST SESS.; TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 69-83 (Comm. Print 1981).
125. See United States Department of Justice Competitive Impact Statement in
Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgement, 47 Fed. Reg. 9170 (1982).
126. See Wiley, Telecommunications Policy in the 1980s: A Decade of Implementa-
tion, in 1 TELEMATICS 11 (1984). See also S. BESEN, DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS 30-34 (March/April 1978).
127. See Webbink, The Recent Deregulatory Movement at the FCC, in TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS IN THE U.S.: TRENDS AND POLICIES 61 (L. Levin ed. 1981).
128. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), aff'd in part, remanded in
part sub nom, Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d
1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
129. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978).
130. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 652 (1980),
aff'd sub. nom., Malrite TV of New York, Inc. v. FCC 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
131. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REG-
ULATION 240-70 (3d ed. 1982).
132. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUB-




its antitrust suit against AT&T, 133 reinforcing the notion that
competition among communications suppliers was a salutary
goal. The courts, too, added their weight to the cause by al-
lowing the FCC greater latitude in forbearing from
regulation.
1 3 1
With competition perceived as a necessary corollary of dereg-
ulation, the FCC, frequently supported by the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration, 135 has sought
to promote entry into new communications markets through
the authorization of new competitive services. These include
direct broadcast satellites, 36 low power television 1 37 mul-
tichannel multipoint distribution service, 138 and digital termi-
nation systems.139 The Commission's open entry policies in the
common carrier field, initiated in its 1971 Specialized Common
Carrier decision, 40 have been extended to reach international
boundaries as well.'
On a political level, deregulation of the communications in-
dustries has fostered an unusual spirit of bi-partisan coopera-
tion, as well as continuity in the transition between Democratic
and Republican administrations. Many of the FCC's deregu-
latory initiatives were begun during the tenure of Chairman
Charles Ferris in the Carter Administration. 4 2 They were
then brought into final form under Chairman Mark Fowler,
who began serving when the Reagan Administration assumed
133. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Div., Competitive Impact Statement in Connection with Proposed Modification of Fi-
nal Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170 (1982).
134. See Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
135. See Geller as Guru, BROADCASTING, Feb. 19, 1979, at 35.
136. See Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, sub. noma., NAB v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. See Low Power Television Service, Report and Order in BC Docket No. 78-
253, FCC 82-107, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 51 RAD. REG. 2d. (P&F) 476 (1982), recon. granted
on other grounds, FCC 83-129, 53 RAD. REG. 2d. (P&F) 1267 (1983).
138. See Instructional Television Fixed Service, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203
(1983), recon. denied, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,147 (July 2, 1984).
139. See Digital Termination Systems, First Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 360
(1981), off'd on recon., 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982).
140. 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n
v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
141. See Goldberg, One-Hundred and Twenty Years of International Communica-
tions, 37 FED. COMM. L. J. 131, 146-52 (1985).




Deregulation has created much enthusiasm within the corpo-
rate offices of communications companies. It also has brought
with it a sense of anxiety among lawyers who have built up sig-
nificant expertise-and a substantial client base-based on an
ability to handle matters by proceeding methodically through
the FCC. For example, the broadcast license renewal applica-
tion has now been reduced to a single, postcard-size form.144
Comparative hearings are being streamlined or else replaced
outright by lotteries that do not require any further legal work
prior to the award of a frequency. 14 5 Many reporting require-
ments have been reduced or eliminated entirely.
1 46
Yet, as in the past, practitioners in the field are adapting to
changes in the regulatory structure. Communications lawyers,
to be sure, will still be called on to interact with the FCC on a
variety of matters. Moreover, their base of skills developed in
federal practice will provide a solid foundation for participating
in administrative proceedings before state public utility com-
missions, where intrastate telephone regulation is developed
and administered.
But the future extends well beyond these realms. The mod-
ern-age communications lawyer can practice successfully in
San Francisco, Chicago, New Orleans, and other cities, as well
as in Washington, D. C. He or she may be representing a client
that seeks to buy or sell a broadcast station or cable system, or a
user group that is evaluating the most cost-efficient voice or
data/message services. Communications lawyers may be in-
volved in initiating or defending a corporate takeover, in final-
izing the terms of a cable television franchise transfer or
renewal, in obtaining a lease for satellite transponder time, in
advising on intellectual property matters outside the jurisdic-
tion of the FCC, or in working out complex contractual ar-
rangements necessary for the establishment of financial
services communications networks. "People are waking up to
the fact that communications is becoming an important and ex-
143. See Fowler, Introduction, 37 FED. COMM. L. J. 71 (1985). See also Still Deregu-
lating After All These Years, BROADCASTING, Apr. 23, 1984, at 37-38.
144. See Postcard Renewal, Opinion & Order in BC Docket No. 80- 253, 87 F.C.C.2d
1127 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
145. See FCC Releases MMDS Order, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 6-58.




citing business," notes former FCC Chairman Richard E. Wi-
ley. "Lawyers are going to have to know a lot more than they
did in the past." '147
One measure of success in communications law practice will
be reflected in the lawyer's ability to keep up with rapidly
changing technological and marketplace developments. This is
an enormous task in itself. Of equal or greater importance,
however, will be the communications lawyer's willingness and
ability to embrace different types of legal skills. Negotiation is
a case in point.
"Negotiation" has a variety of connotations. This author
views negotiation as a process in which two or more parties
sharing both common and conflicting interests make and dis-
cuss explicit proposals concerning specific terms of a possible
agreement.148
The traditional basis for communications lawyers to perceive
negotiation is along the lines of the competitive or adversarial
model. 4 9 Moreover, much of the legal literature on negotiation
reinforces the adversarial model by focusing on how best to
maximize a client's gains.150
Professor James J. White, for example, summarized his rec-
ommendations for adversarial negotiators in this way: "On the
one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful, on the other
hand he must mislead his opponent.... To conceal one's true
position, to mislead an opponent about one's true settling point,
is the essence of negotiation." '51
This approach to negotiation is based on a zero-sum ap-
proach 152-namely, that what one party gains the other must
147. Lynch, The Hot New Areas of Law Practice, 70 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 72, 74.
148. Ways, The Virtues, Dangers, and Limits of Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION:
READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 20 (R. Lewicki & J. Litterer eds. 1985).
149. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 756 n.3 (1984); cf. Murray, Under-
standing Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J. 179, 186 (1986) (concluding
that as a negotiator becomes more successful, his techniques resemble the problem-
solving rather than adversarial approach).
150. See, e.g., H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR 112 (1977);
C. PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION (2d ed. 1980); G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 9 (1983).
151. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
80 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927 (1980).
152. See Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Test-
able Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 227 (1982). See also J. VON
NEUMANN & 0. MORGANSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(1944); H. RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 14 n.1 (1982).
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lose. The resource pie is finite, and every outcome turns on
how that pie is divided. As noted by Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow:
This approach is based on the assumption that the adver-
sarial negotiation model is that the parties desire the same
goals, items or values.... Simply put, in the pure adversarial
case, each party wants as much as he can get of the things bar-
gained for, and the more one party receives, the less the other
party receives. There is a "winner" in the negotiation, deter-
mined by which party got more.
153
The adversarial negotiation model represents a linear struc-
ture, "a sequence of offers and counter-offers for dividing the
stakes."' 54 But as Professor Howard Raiffa notes, "In most
complicated conflicts there is not one issue to be decided, but
several interacting issues." 55
The contrast between the single-issue focus of adversarial ne-
gotiation and the multi-issue focus of business agreements sug-
gests one reason why traditional notions about negotiation may
not be effective in a deregulated environment. "When there
are several issues to be jointly determined through negotiation,
the negotiating parties have an opportunity to considerably en-
large the pie."' 56 They also are in a better position to focus on a
broader range of underlying needs or interests, and may be
more sensitive to the long-term consequences of a proposed
solution.
An alternative model of negotiation theory has developed in
recent years and it presents an opportunity for communications
lawyers to re-examine historic, and in some cases reflexive, as-
sumptions. The problem-solving school focuses on finding solu-
tions to the underlying needs and objectives of the parties. 5 7
Although strategies are still employed, they are subordinate to
the process of identifying possible solutions. The end result is a
broader range of solutions to negotiation problems.
153. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 149, at 764-65.
154. Id. at 768 n.54, quoting Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, supra note 152, at 228.
155. H. RAIFFA, supra note 152, at 14.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION (0. Young ed.
1975); A. CODDINGTON, THEORIES OF THE BARGAINING PROCESS (1968); COOPERATION
AND COMPETITION IN MIXED MOTIVE GAMES (L. Wrightsman ed. 1972); J. RUBIN & B.
BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 197-213 (1975);
R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
41-57 (1981); H. RAIFFA, supra note 152.
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In some ways, this model follows economic theories about the
marketplace. It recognizes that not all individuals value the
same things in the same way.15 Consequently, the ability to
exploit different or complementary needs will produce a wider
variety of solutions that better reflect the parties' needs. Nego-
tiation, under this model, is not viewed as a battle of wills, but
rather as "a quintessential illustration of interdependence. ' 159
The problem-solving approach emphasizes different values
than the adversarial approach where each side advances argu-
ments "for a result that would take care of its interests but
would do nothing for the other side. 1 60 The former encourages
the inventing of good or "elegant" solutions as an effective way
to influence the other side.16' Thus, each party has no incentive
to engage in a test of strength; all have comparable power to
affect an agreement that takes care of personal interests by in-
venting an option that satisfies some or most of the other side's
interests.
A closer focus on problem-solving negotiation in practice sug-
gests how this approach can add to the skill level a communica-
tions lawyer needs in order to maintain a superior ability to
deal with increasingly complex problems.
Licenses for the top thirty cellular mobile telephone markets
were awarded on the basis of comparative hearings. The Com-
mission, based on its experience, found that process too cum-
bersome. In 1984, it announced that a lottery would be im-
plemented for markets thirty-one to ninety.' 62 Although the
goal of quicker licensing and market entry was commendable,
the FCC's dramatic departure did not fully account for all the
interests of applicants. Speed, of course, was one obvious inter-
est. But applicants had also geared up for the comparative
hearing process by spending upwards of $150,000 per applica-
tion in order to build the strongest case during formal hear-
ings. 163 By switching to a lottery, the Commission in effect
158. Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, supra note 149, at
181.
159. Rubin, Negotiation: An Introduction to Some Issues and Themes, 27 AM. BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENTIST 135, 137 (1983).
160. Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 149, 157 (1983).
161. Id.
162. See Lottery Makes Interesting Cellular Bedfellows, BROADCASTING, Oct. 8,
1984, at 48.
163. Id. at 48-49.
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discounted the capitalized expenses incurred by applicants to
zero, and increased the odds of obtaining an allocation by em-
ploying random selection at the same time.
After analyzing the situation, lawyers representing appli-
cants in all but six of these markets recognized that their dual
interest in speedy resolution and the protection of existing in-
vestments would be better served by negotiations. The process
was initiated by several applicants for major cities, including
Metromedia and MCI. Two major alliances were then organ-
ized and a pool arrangement was established, providing an op-
portunity to trade interests in other markets. This allowed
applicants to consolidate their "holdings by taking larger shares
in fewer markets.'
'1 64
Under this scheme, settlements were reached in a single way.
For example, "[i]f there were ten applicants in a settled mar-
ket, each applicant came out with a one-tenth interest (except
where a multimarket applicant had traded that one-tenth in-
terest to a multicity applicant in another market).' 1 65 This so-
lution proved so creative that within five days, 700-odd
applications for cellular licenses in fifty-four cities had agreed
to such an arrangement.
66
The FCC was caught by surprise. It quickly cancelled plans
for lotteries in these markets, since only one applicant re-
mained.167 The single applicant plan also protected all parties
had the FCC attempted to reverse course again by reinstating
comparative hearings. An elegant solution had been achieved,
and the art of communications lawyering was enhanced.
VI
Conclusion
Communications lawyers thrive on dealing with rapid and
often unpredictable changes in technology and regulation. For
the past fifty years, they have demonstrated a continuing abil-
ity to adapt to these changes in order to serve existing clients
and to attract new ones.
The challenge of communications law practice for the bal-
ance of this century, and perhaps beyond, adds another layer of
164. See Bernstein, Cellular Speedup, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 1984, at 165, 168.
165. Lottery Makes Interesting Cellular Bedfellows, supra note 162, at 48.
166. Bernstein, supra note 164.
167. Id. at 168.
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complexity. Practitioners faced with the realities of deregula-
tion will need to refine skills such as negotiation while retain-
ing those developed through administrative activities and
appellate litigation.
Perhaps as the twenty-first century begins, the phrase "com-
munications lawyer" may itself seem antiquated. The new
level of sophistication in communications law practice makes
the phrase "communications counselor" a more apt description
of what contemporary law practice in this field is all about.

